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COMMENTS

The Constitution, the Military, and
Homosexuals: Should the Military's

Policies Concerning Homosexuals be
Modified?
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The
presence in the military environment of persons who engage in
homosexual conduct and who, by their statements, demonstrate
a tendency to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs
the accomplishment of the military mission.1

I. Introduction
Joseph Steffan was in the top ten of his class of approximately
4,500 midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy. He maintained straight A's in academic performance and in conduct. In his
senior year, he was a battalion commander and was responsible for
about 800 midshipmen. He was a star athlete in high school, and
had twice sung the national anthem at the annual Army-Navy game.
Mr. Steffan was never commissioned into the Navy, however. Only
weeks before graduation, he was forced to resign from the Naval
Academy after he admitted his homosexuality.'
The military's policy towards homosexuals is one of
blanket ex1. Army Regulations, AR 635-200, ch. 15-1.
2. Mr. Steffan was given the choice of resigning or being discharged. Nightline: Homosexuals in the Military (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 30, 1989) (transcript on file at Dickinson Law Review office) [hereinafter Nightline]. Mr. Steffan took his case to court. Steffan v.
Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 121 (D.D.C. 1989). The court held that Mr. Steffan's refusal to answer
the deposition question regarding homosexual activities required dismissal of the suit. Id. at
128.
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clusion and mandatory separation, with a few minor exceptions.$ Approximately 1,400 service members are separated from the military
each year because .of their homosexuality.4 Almost certainly, many
more homosexuals serve in the armed forces without being discovered. Of those discovered, most are separated with general or honorable discharges. 6 Officers are given the option of resigning their commissions.7 Occasionally, an individual who is separated challenges
the military policies and regulations on homosexuality."
No federal appellate court has upheld any of the constitutional
claims of separated homosexual service members, and the Supreme
Court seems unlikely to do so in the near future.9 In cases such as
Mr. Steffan's, however, in which an individual has an excellent service record and a demonstrated fitness for military service, the military's blanket policies against homosexuals are under increased scrutiny. 10 A recent Ninth Circuit concurring opinion exposes some wellreasoned constitutional challenges to the military's posture concerning homosexuals and may lead to a change of military policy by the
end of the century. 1
This Comment will examine the rationale behind the military's
policy of excluding homosexuals and the merits of its reasoning.
Next, this Comment will consider the general posture of the federal
courts toward military affairs and regulations and the constitutional
claims brought by separated homosexual service members against
the military. These claims include alleged violations of procedural
due process, substantive due process, the first amendment right to
3. See Air Force, AFR 39-10; Army, AR 635-200, ch. 15; Marine Corps, MARCORPSEPMAN 6207; Navy, NAVILPERSMAN 3630400.
4. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at D20, col. 3.

5. One commentator estimates that 75-80% of all homosexual soldiers successfully complete their terms of service. Rivera, Our Straight Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons In The United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 818, 841 (1979). See also N.Y.
Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al, col. I for a detailed article on military personnel who conceal
their homosexuality.
6. Nightline, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. For other cases of service members discharged for homosexuality despite excellent
service records, see Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 854 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474, 475 n.l (3d Cir. 1967); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F.
Supp. 192, 203-04 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom., Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
9. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. Nightline, supra note 2. The military's policy against homosexuals has created pres-

sure in some major universities to terminate their Reserve Officer's Training Programs. Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 19, 1990, at All, col. 1.
11. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711-31 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
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privacy, and equal protection under the fifth amendment.1 2 Finally,
this Comment will analyze a method other than blanket exclusion
that would allow the military to separate those homosexuals who decrease the efficiency of the military, and yet still retain those who
could benefit the armed forces.
II. Background and History of the Military's Policy Toward
Homosexuals
The roots of the military's policy towards homosexuals are
found in society's historical perceptions of homosexuals.1 8 In colonial
America, the laws against homosexuality were based on both biblical
condemnations and English precedent banning "crimes against nature." 4 The Bible classified homosexual conduct as a capital offense."5 Although rarely enforced, this became the law in early
America until well after the American Revolution.' Virginia also
relied on the English "buggery" statute of 1533 to characterize homosexual acts as capital crimes.' 7 As late as 1776, Virginia rejected
Thomas Jefferson's "liberalized" suggestion that called for the penalty of castration rather than death for homosexuals.'
State legislatures eventually reshaped the common law by
adopting statutes that reduced the penalties for the crime of sodomy.' 9 Today, close to one half of the states criminalize the act of
sodomy.2 0 The United States Supreme Court, however, recognized
the constitutionality of such statutes in the landmark case of Bowers
12. Although there is no explicit equal protection language in the fifth amendment, the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been incorporated into the fifth
amendment by the courts. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
13. McCrary & Gutierrez, The Homosexual Person in the Military and in National

Security Employment, in

HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW

115-7 (D. Knutson ed. 1980).

14. Oaks, Perceptions of Homosexuality by Justices of the Peace in Colonial Virginia,
in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW 35, 37 (D. Knutson ed. 1980).
15. "If a man has intercourse with a man as with a woman, they both commit an abomination. They shall be put to death; their blood shall be on their own heads." Leviticus 20:13.
See also Leviticus 18:22 ("You shall not lie with a male as with a woman, it is an
abomination.").
16. Oaks, supra note 14, at 35. There is only one recorded execution for homosexuality
from Virginia, in 1625. Id. at 39.
17. Id. at 36. Henry VIlI's "buggery" statute equated homosexual sodomy with bestiality. Id.
18. Id. at 39. Jefferson also proposed cutting a half inch hole in the nasal cartilage of
homosexual women. Id.
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 810.100

(Baldwin 1989);

NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 201.190 (1987).

20. Miller, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny
to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 800 (1984); Henry, Uniform Treatment for Gays, TIME, Feb. 22, 1988, at 55.
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v. Hardwick,2 which held that there is no fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy.2
Although criminal sanctions against homosexuality have decreased in severity since colonial times, they have not disappeared.
America's less-than-receptive attitude towards homosexuality persists today. 8 Perhaps because Americans are unsure how to react to
homosexuality, society attempts to ignore the presence of homosexuals, if not openly condemn them.2
Historically, the American military has mirrored society's rejection of homosexuals. For instance, General George Washington approved of the court martial and discharge of one of his officers for
attempted sodomy "with Abhorrence and Detestation of Such Infamous crimes." 2 This rejection has been carried into current military
policies. 28 Today's military policies, which exclude all homosexuals
from entering the service and which require discharge of those subsequently discovered, seem to parallel Washington's opinion. 2' In addition to the policy of separation, Article 125 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice criminalizes sodomy." "[U]nnatural carnal copulation" may be punished with up to five years of hard labor for consensual sodomy. 9
III. Judicial Deference to the Military and Congress in Internal
Military Affairs
Knowledge of the standard of review is essential to understand
judicial evaluation of constitutional claims of homosexuals separated
from the military. The judiciary has been typically very deferential
when addressing military matters, and especially when examining internal military affairs and regulation of personnel.30 Constitutional
claims challenging internal military policies and regulations warrant
a less burdensome standard of review than if the same claims were
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 190-96.
See Toufexis, Is the Gay Revolution a Flop?, TIME, July 10, 1989, at 36.
Id.
Note, Dronenberg v. Zech: FundamentalRights and the Military, 16 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 531, 532 n.10 (1986) (quoting BOURDONNAY, Military and Veterans, SEXUAL ORI21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

ENTATION AND THE LAW

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
REV. 53,

§ 6-3 (R. Achtenberg ed. 1985)).

Id. at 532-33.
See supra note 3.
10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988).
Id. The punishment applies if the participants were over sixteen years old.
Folk, Military Appearance Requirements and Free Exercise of Religion, 98 MIL. L.
75 (1982).
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brought against a civilian employer. 81 Under such a system, homosexuals separated from the military face an added obstacle in their
efforts to establish that the military's policies are unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that the special character of the military warrants a deferential review of constitutional
claims.8" In Goldman v. Weinberger,8 the Court upheld a military
restriction that directly infringed upon a soldier's religious freedom,
one normally protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment."' The military regulations at issue forbade service members
from wearing any headgear other than regulation headgear outdoors,
and from wearing any headgear inside. 5 Goldman, an Air Force officer, was court-martialled for refusing to stop wearing his yarmulke,
a symbol of his Jewish religion and faith.8 The Court upheld the
regulation because "courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest. 3 7 Although a similar regulation in a civilian organization would not justify the infringement
on religious freedom, "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society,"3 and the essence of military
service "is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service. ' ' a
The Court further noted that "'[Courts are] ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion
upon military authority might have.' "40 As former Chief Justice
Warren stated, "[m]any of the problems of the military society are,
in a sense, alien to the problems with which the judiciary is trained
41
to deal."
The deferential attitude of the Goldman Court is well-grounded
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see also Brown v. Glines,
444 U.S. 348 (1980) (the Court upheld a military regulation preventing service members from
circulating petitions for Congress); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (the Court upheld the
court martial of a service member who made statements against the war in Vietnam).
33. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 508-09. See AFR 35-10 V I-6.h (1980); AFR 35-10 %106.h(2)(f) (1980).
36. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509.
37. Id. at 507.
38. Id. at 506.
39. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953)).
40. Id. at 507 (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.

181, 187 (1962)).
41.

Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187 (1962).
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in America's history.4 2 Article III of the Constitution makes no reference to judicial supervision of military affairs. Instead, Congress
was given the power to make the rules and regulations governing the
military.' Congress, in turn, has given the military broad discretion
to run itself and to promulgate regulations determining eligibility for
service." As a result, the composition and qualifications of the
armed forces is a matter for Congress and for the military.'5 Thus,
the Court in Goldman observed that "'judicial deference . . . is at
its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority
to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their
governance is challenged.' ""
Judicial deference, however, is not an abdication of all judicial
review.' Service members retain their constitutional rights, though
to a lesser degree than the rights accorded their civilian counterparts.' 8 The Court of Military Appeals has repeatedly held that the
protection afforded by the Bill of Rights is applicable to service
members except when the right in question is expressly or impliedly
inapplicable. 9 Therefore, although the courts must be reluctant to
intervene in military affairs, the protection of many of the Bill of
Rights extend to military personnel.5 0
Judicial review of military affairs involves a balance of service
members' rights against the traditional deference afforded the military. Although it is clear that judicial deference does not give the
military carte blanche to run its affairs, the Supreme Court has
1
never stated a formula for striking the proper balance.5
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
44. See Hesig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 10 U.S.C.A. §§
505, 510 (West 1983).
45. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1972); Lindenau v. Alexander, 663 F.2d 68 (10th
Cir. 1981).
46. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
47. James Madison did not want a military entirely isolated from review. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 41 at 262-63 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1976).
48. Cox, Army Courts and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118
MIL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1987).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Blaumhauser v. Andrews, 663 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1980).
51. See, e.g., Falk v. Secretary of the Army, 870 F.2d 941, 945 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
that deference does not give carte blanche to the military); Folk, supra note 30, at 75-76.
Although the Supreme Court has never announced a test, some lower courts have stated that
"a court should not review international military affairs in the absence of (a) an allegation of
the deprivation of a constitutional right . . . and (b) exhaustion of available intraservice corrective measures." Mindes v. Sealman, 453 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1971).
Not all allegations are reviewable, however. The court must examine the allegation in
light of the policy reasons behind deference to the military by looking at the following: (I) the
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Although there is no articulated formula for balancing an individual's rights against the need to extend deference to the military,
courts are forced to strike a balance when they consider the constitutional claims of homosexuals who have been separated from the military. In past cases, great deference was given to military decisions.
For instance, the court in Woodward v. United States 2 held that it
would not substitute its views for the professional judgment of the
military when it upheld a homosexual sailor's release from active
duty.53 Other courts that have rejected claims of constitutional violations brought by discharged homosexuals have placed more emphasis
on the special needs of the military to maintain discipline and good
order."
Courts have not required the military to show with particularity
the basis for its regulations and policies."5 For instance, in Brown v.
Glines," the Supreme Court did not question the government's claim
that allowing service members to petition without prior approval by
superiors would disrupt discipline.57 In fact, the Court in Rostker v.
Goldberg 8 chastised a lower court for scrutinizing too closely the
reasons Congress decided that only males should be required to register for a potential draft. 9 Also, in Belier v. Middendorf, ° the
Court noted that the due process clause does not require that the
government show a strong factual basis for the reasons behind the
general policy of discharging homosexuals from the Navy. 1 In short,
there seems to be a strong presumption of minimal scrutiny when
courts evaluate constitutional claims against the military.
nature and strength of the plaintiff's challenge to the military determination; (2) the potential
injury to the plaintiff if review is refused; (3) the type and degree of anticipated interference
with the military function; and (4) the extent to which the exercise of military expertise or
discretion is involved. See Folk, supra note 30, at 76 n.146 (citing Mindes, 453 F.2d at 20102).
52. 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990).
53. Id. at 1077.
54. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub
nor., Ben-Shalom v. Stone, I10 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1387
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
55. Folk, supra note 30, at 78.
56. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
57. Id. at 353.
58. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
59. See id. at 68-69, 82-83.
60. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
61. Id. at 808 n.20.
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The Rationale Behind the Military's Policy of Separating

Homosexuals*
A.

The Military's Position

Just as the courts grant judicial deference to the military because of the armed forces' special needs, the military also cites these
special needs in justifying its discretionary policies towards homosexuals.62 The armed forces maintain that the presence of homosexual
62.

The Army's Policy Statement in AR 635-200, ch. 15-1 provides:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in
the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct
or who, by their statements, demonstrate a tendency to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such soldiers adversely affects the ability of the
armed forces to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust, and confidence among soldiers; to insure the integrity of the
system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of soldiers who frequently must live and work under close conditions affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain soldiers of the
armed forces; to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and
to prevent breaches of security.
A homosexual act is defined in AR 635-200, ch. 15-2(c) as follows:
A homosexual act means bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between persons of the same sex for sexual satisfaction.

Id.
An affidavit from the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel outlined the Navy's reasons for
its policy in Belier. The affidavit stated in part:
It is considered that administrative processing is mandatory. This is because
it is perceived that homosexuality adversely impacts on the effective and efficient
performance in the mission of the United States Navy in several particulars.
(a) Tensions and hostilities would certainly exist between known
homosexuals and the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest homosexuality, especially in the unique close living conditions aboard
ships.
(b) An individual's performance of duties could be unduly influenced
by emotional relationships with other homosexuals.
(c) Traditional chain of command problems could be created, i.e., a
proper command relationship could be subverted by an emotional relationship; an officer or senior enlisted person who exhibits homosexual tendencies will be unable to maintain the necessary respect and trust from
the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest homosexuality,
and this would most certainly degrade the individual's ability to successfully perform his duties of supervision and command.
(d) There would be an adverse impact on recruiting should parents
become concerned with their children associating with individuals who
are incapable of maintaining high moral standards.
(e) A homosexual might force his desires upon others or attempt to
do so. This would certainly be disruptive.
(f) Homosexuals may be less productive/effective than their heterosexual counterparts because of:
(1) Fear of criminal prosecution;
(2) Fear of social stigmatization;
(3) Fear of loss of spouse and/or family through divorce proceedings as a result of disclosure;
(4) Undue influence by a homosexual partner.
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service members adversely affects discipline, morale, and good order.6" History's battlefields have proven the value and necessity of
these qualities in military forces. 6" The military is concerned about
the tensions between homosexual and heterosexual service members.65 The military argues that discipline could break down if
soldiers feel uncomfortable working with, or harbor strong convictions against, some of the members of their unit. 6 The unique living
conditions in the military are cited to further support the military's
6
position. 7
The military also is concerned with the detrimental effect of potential breaches of proper command relationships, or tensions resulting from homosexual relationships between soldiers. 68 Such relationships could invite one partner in the relationship to exert undue
influence upon, or to cause tensions with, the other partner. 69 In Doe
v. Chaffee,7 0 a naval serviceman was discharged after he revealed
that the problems and tensions of his homosexual relationship with a
shipmate made it difficult, if not impossible, to perform his duties.7 '
The military is especially concerned that homosexual leaders
might not be able to carry out their command responsibilities. Military leaders fear that homosexuals in leadership positions may not be
able to command the respect and trust of the troops they lead. 72 The
military's ultimate mission is to be prepared for combat.7 8 Effectiveness in combat depends upon soldiers who are disciplined and who
obey their superiors. If troops do not trust their leader, they will be
less willing to follow that leader. Hesitation on the battlefield would
almost certainly reduce effectiveness and increase American
Belier, 632 F.2d at 811 n.22.
63. Id.
64. The discipline and organization of its legions distinguished Roman armies from their
less organized and more barbarian foes. See generally J. WARRY, WARFARE IN THE CLASSICAL
WORLD 100-217 (1980). Frederick the Great's victories were due to the unwavering precision
and obedience of his Prussian soldiers. See FREDERICK THE GREAT ON THE ART OF WAR 77
(J. Luvass ed. 1966). Napoleon used esprit de corps and morale to enhance an extremely wellordered fighting force and so gained an advantage over his opponents. See generally J. ELTING.
SWORDS AROUND A THRONE: NAPOLEON'S GRANDE ARMEE (1988).
65. See Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
66. Id.
67. Naval vessels offer very limited living space, and very little privacy. Land-based
troops similarly share open barracks, tents, and fighting positions. See Hatheway v. Secretary
of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Belier, 632 F.2d at 811.

68.

See supra note 62.

69. See Belier, 632 F.2d at 811 n.22.
70. 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
71. Id. at 113.
72. See supra note 62.
73. Carry v. Secretary of the Army, 595 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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casualties.
The military has also justified its policies by citing an interest in
preventing breaches of security and preventing soldiers from revealing classified information.7 4 Homosexual personnel are considered potential security risks because they are likely to breach security if threatened with exposure of their homosexuality. 8
The military also has a great interest in its public image and in
the effects of that image on recruitment and retention.7 6 Because
America's military is all volunteer, public approval is critical to
maintaining military strength and to attracting good recruits. Because homosexuals have not been generally accepted by our society,
the military would prefer to avoid the potential adverse effects on
recruitment, retention, and public acceptance that could occur if
homosexuals were accepted into the services. 7
The military's public image could be damaged in another way.
The military, as well as the government, has an interest in preventing criminal conduct. Because of homosexuals' alleged "propensity to
commit criminal sodomy,"78 accepting them into the military would,
in effect, condone sodomy. This would defy the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and would run counter to laws in nearly half of the
states.79
B. The Military's Rationale Under Scrutiny
Considering the reasons presented by the armed forces and the
deferential treatment applied by the judiciary to the military, it is no
wonder that most claims of discharged homosexuals are summarily
dismissed in district courts.80 The military's reasons for discharging
homosexuals do not, however,' withstand close inspection. One commentator noted that "[iun most cases, . . . the military . . . must
depend on unproven generalizations about military efficiency and
• . . stereotypes." 8'
Although later reversed, the district court in Saal v. Mid74. See supra note 62.
75. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 13, at 133.
76. See supra note 61; see also Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1350
(1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (1989).
77. See Toufexis, supra note 23, at 56.
78. Lieutenant Colonel Greg Rixon, an Army spokesman in Washington, said that the
Army's policy bars all homosexuals because of their ."propensity to commit criminal sodomy."
N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1989, at A14, col. 2.
79. See supra notes 20, 28.
80. See Note, supra note 26, at 536.
81. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 30, at 121.
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dendorJ82 rejected the Navy's generalized rationale against retaining
homosexual personnel." The court noted that the same reasons could
apply equally to persons other than homosexuals, and the stated reasons were problems "endemic to a heterogeneous society."' 84 In particular, the court observed that the "good order" and "tensions" rationales could justify the exclusion of both minorities and other
disfavored groups."
The American armed forces have withstood changes in racial
and gender standards. Those particular changes were challenged by
arguments similar to those offered against accepting homosexual
personnel. 86 The military's fear of racial tension kept black soldiers
segregated from whites until the Second World War.87 A fear of
sexual tensions kept the participation of female soldiers to a minimum until even later. 8 Both blacks and females have been integrated into the military, however, without reducing its effectiveness.89 As one court observed, "[t]he peculiar nature of Army life
has always required the melding together of disparate personalities."9 Thus, absent a particular showing of unfitness, open integration of homosexuals into the military might not cause the disciplinary disruption that the military fears.
The military has an interest in preventing the emotional relationships between its members from affecting duty and performance.
The laws against fraternization in the military are aimed at minimizing the potential ill effects of such relationships. 9 If homosexuals
were admitted openly into the military, the fraternization requirements would apply to them as well. Thus, any potential ill effects
from homosexual relationships would be no different than the potential ill effects from heterosexual relationships.
The military also has a great interest in excluding persons susceptible to blackmail. Homosexuals, however, are a greater security
82. 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
83. Id.at 201.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 729 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
87. Id.
88. See Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D. Wis. 1980),
affid, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub nom., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
89. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 729 (Norris, J., concurring); Ben-Shalom, 489 F. Supp. at
976.
90. Ben-Shalom, 489 F. Supp. at 976.
91. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1988).
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risk only because homosexuality constitutes grounds for discharge.92
If homosexuals were admitted openly, they would not have to hide
their sexual preferences, and thus would no longer present a special
risk.93 The military could still discharge those homosexuals who lie
94
about their orientation on the grounds of fraudulent enlistment.

Open admittance would encourage homosexuals
to declare them95
selves, and would reduce' the security risk.

Although the military asserts that its public image would be
harmed if it accepted homosexuals, 91 this does not appear to be certain. The federal government can no longer dismiss an employee
merely because he or she is homosexual.97 Instead, the government
must show a rational link between the employee's sexuality and a
decrease in efficiency before it may dismiss the individual.99
V.

The Constitutional Claims of Discharged Homosexuals

A. The First Amendment: Association and Speech
The military's reasons behind its treatment of homosexual personnel are not entirely without merit, and those reasons withstand
the rational basis standard of review. Those reasons do not, however,
withstand stricter scrutiny. Thus, in order for discharged homosexuals to prevail on constitutional grounds, they must convince the
courts to apply a higher level of scrutiny to the military's policies. 99
One way in which homosexuals can gain a higher standard of scru-

tiny is to allege violations of their first amendment rights.'
92. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 731 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
93. Id.
94. Soldiers could be discharged on the grounds of fraudulent enlistment. See Uniform
Code of Military Justice art. 83, 10 U.S.C. § 883 (1988).
95. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 731 (Norris, J.,concurring).
96. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
97. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
98. Id. at 1165-68.
99. Strict scrutiny requires a compelling governmental interest and no less restrictive
means; intermediate scrutiny requires a substantial relation to an important governmental interest; rational basis review requires a rational relation to a legitimate government interest.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
100. See Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
("Ben-Shalom I").
The procedural history of Ben-Shalom is extensive. In Ben-Shalom I, the complainant
challenged the constitutionality of her discharge. The court held the Army's regulations were
overbroad under the first amendment, and violative of Ben-Shalom's right to privacy. Id. at
972-74. The court ordered Ben-Shalom's restatement. Id. at 975.
The Army did not appeal the decision, but did fail to comply with the court's order of
reinstatement. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454-56 (7th Cir. 1989). As late as August
1987, the Army resisted the reinstatement order on the grounds that the regulation under
which Ben-Shalom was discharged had been reworded. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 826 F.2d 722
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For instance, Army Staff Sergeant Miriam Ben-Shalom alleged
violations of her first amendment rights to freedom of speech and to
freedom of association.10 1 Although Ben-Shalom stated that she was
a homosexual, there was no evidence that she ever participated in
homosexual conduct or that her sexual preference interfered with her
job performance.10 2 Ben-Shalom maintained that the military regulation equally targeted those whose status was homosexual and those
who performed homosexual acts, and thus violated her first amendment rights.10 At the time of suit, the Army's regulation on homosexuals permitted the discharge of soldiers who had homosexual tendencies or interests, without regard to actual conduct.1 04 Thus, BenShalom asserted that the regulation infringed on her right to make
statements regarding her sexual orientation. 0
The lower court in Ben-Shalom found the regulation to be overbroad in light of the chill it imposed on the first amendment liberties
of soldiers who might only have an interest in or tendency toward
homosexuality.1 0 Although the court recognized that the Army
rarely enforced this part of the regulation, they felt it remained a
readily available tool of intimidation. 0 7 As a result, the court held
that the regulation infringed on a soldier's right to meet with homosexuals to discuss current problems, to advocate changes in the status quo, to receive information about homosexuals, or to make statements that might be interpreted as supporting homosexuality.1 08
Emphasizing a distinction between homosexual personalities and
those who conduct homosexual acts, Judge Evans stated, "[I]t can(7th Cir. 1987). The court of appeals ordered Ben-Shalom's reinstatement despite the change
in the regulation. Id.
Ben-Shalom was reinstated; however, she was later denied reenlistment under the new
regulations. 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (E.D. Wis. 1987) ("Ben-Shalom 11"). She challenged the
new regulation, and was granted a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo. The court
ordered the Army to consider her reenlistment without regard to her homosexuality. 690 F.
Supp. 774 (E.D. Wis. 1988). The Army refused Ben-Shalom's reenlistment. As a result, the
Army was held in contempt, and forced to reenlist Ben-Shalom pending further litigation. BenShalom I1, 703 F. Supp. at 1374. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court's
decision. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Ben-Shalom III"). The Supreme Court declined to
review this decision. See Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990) (denying certiorari).
101. Ben-Shalom 1, 489 F. Supp. at 972-74.
102. Id. at 972-73.
103. Id.
104. AR 135-178 T 7-56(6). The current regulation, AR 635-200, ch. 15-2(a) provides:
"Homosexual means a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." Id.
105. Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 972-73 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
("Ben-Shalom I").
106. Id. at 974-76.
107. Id. at 974-77.
108. Id.
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not be assumed that all who have personalities orientated toward homosexuality necessarily engage in homosexual conduct."10 9 Because
Ben-Shalom had a homosexual personality only, the court found that
her first amendment interests outweighed the military's.110
Nearly ten years after Ben-Shalom I was decided, the Army
amended its policies regarding homosexuals"' and petitioned to have
its case reheard regarding the new policies. 2 The Army had revised
its regulation so that it no longer affected those who evidenced "tendencies" or "interests" in homosexuality, and argued for a reversal
of Ben-Shalom I based on these new policies.118 Judge Gordon
noted, however, that the Army could still affect status homosexuals,
or those who state a "desire" for homosexual conduct, and that the
Army wrongly equated them with "conduct" homosexuals. " Relying on Ben-Shalom I, the court held that the regulation still burdened first amendment rights more than was reasonably necessary to
protect military interests. 1 5 The Army argued that an acknowledgment of a desire for homosexual conduct suggested an "obvious connection" with the propensity to engage in homosexual conduct; however, the court rejected the Army's "common sense" approach and
maintained a distinction between status and conduct. " 6
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the lower courts,
and found no first amendment violations." 7 The court felt bound by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Glines.1 8 In Brown,
the Court upheld a regulation prohibiting the circulation of petitions
by members of the armed forces, despite the petitioners first amendment interests. " ' Relying on Brown, the court in Ben-Shalom III
found the military's interest in discipline to be separate from the
suppression of free expression.1 20 Unlike the regulation in Ben-Shalom I, the court found that the current regulation did not prohibit
109. Id. at 975.
110. Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
("Ben-Shalom I").
Il1.
See supra note 104.
112. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989) ("Ben-Shalom Il"),
rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Ben-Shalom III"), cert. denied sub nom., Ben-Shalom v.
Stone, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
113. Id. at 1377.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. id.
117. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (1989) ("Ben-Shalom Ill"), rev'g, 703 F.
Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
118. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
119. Id.
120. Ben-Shalom I1, 881 F.2d at 462.
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speech per se.' 2 ' Soldiers could speak freely concerning homosexuality or the Army's policy, and they could meet with and converse with
homosexuals. A soldier could not, however, declare himself to be homosexual, as had Sergeant Ben-Shalom. 2 By doing so, the soldier
became an identified homosexual and subject to separation. It is the
identification, not the actual statement, that is the focus of the regulation. 12a Thus, any first amendment violation was only incidental to
124
the military's special interests in efficiency and discipline.
Judge Wood from the Seventh Circuit also bridged the prior
distinction between status and actual conduct. 12 Sergeant Ben-Shalom's admission of homosexuality was taken by the court to imply, at
the very least, a desire to commit criminal acts of homosexuality
that would subject her to discharge.' 26 As a matter of policy and
deference to the military, the court felt that "the Army [did] not
have to take the risk that an admitted homosexual will not commit
homosexual acts which may be detrimental to its assigned
mission.* "127
Other courts agreed with the Seventh Circuit and refused to
recognize a distinction between status and conduct. In Pruitt v.
Weinberger,2 8 an Army captain was discharged after she acknowledged she was homosexual. 12 1 Captain Pruitt claimed that the discharge violated her first amendment rights because the regulation
punished status equally with conduct. 30 The court rejected the distinction.' 8 ' Pruitt's admission placed her in the class of people the
Army had found incompatible with its mission."' The court held
that the Army was understandably apprehensive that Pruitt's admission of homosexuality would ripen into actual conduct. Thus, the discharge was upheld.'
Underlying these first amendment decisions, there seems to be a
conflict between approaching the cases with a broad versus narrow
121. Id.
122. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 456, 462 (1989) ("Ben-Shalom III"), rev'g,
703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
123. AR 635-200, ch. 15-2(a), supra note 104.
124. Ben-Shalom I11, 881 F.2d at 462.
125. Id. at 460.
126. IId.
127. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 460-61 (1989) ("Ben-Shalom IlII"), rev'g,
703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
128. 659 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
129. Id. at 626-27.
130. Id. at 627.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625, 627 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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perspective. Under a narrow case by case approach, homosexuals
have more meritorious claims. It seems unlikely that all homosexuals
engage in homosexual acts. Thus, it appears unfair for the military
to apply a rationale that stems from conduct against those status
homosexuals who do not participate in homosexual conduct.
On the other hand, under a broad perspective, it seems unrealistic to imagine that admitted homosexuals do not engage in homosexual conduct, or at least have the propensity to do so. The government's interest in deterring criminal sodomy is substantial. 8 4 Thus,
the military should not be required to assume the risk of a particular
individual whose class, taken as a whole, demonstrates a propensity
to commit criminal acts. This appears especially true in light of the
court's traditional deference to the military.18 5
B. Religion
Although most of the first amendment claims of homosexuals
separated from the military focus on the freedom of speech and association, one officer claimed a violation of the first amendment's prohibition of laws establishing a religion.' 8s Lieutenant Hatheway argued that Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice had
religious origins and retained its religious character. 87 Although the
Army did not deny that laws against sodomy had religious origins,
the Army asserted that secular policies such as preventing a disruption of discipline were served by its regulations."'a The court accepted these policies as secular and rejected Lieutenant Hatheway's
claim. 89 As long as courts accept the military's position that its policy against homosexuals serves secular goals, claims like Lieutenant
Hatheway's are bound to fail.
C. Due Process Concerns: Property Interests
Many more homosexuals separated from the military have alleged deprivation of a fifth amendment property interest than have
made claims based upon religious liberty. These have, likewise, met
with limited success. 4 0 Courts consistently have declined to recognize that homosexuals have a property interest in their military em134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id.

138. Id. at 1383-84.
139.
140.

Id. at 1384.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ployment. 1 ' For a court to find a protected property interest, the
individual must establish a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to continued employment.14 2 Once homosexuals admit their status or otherwise are determined to have violated the military standards, they
can no longer harbor any reasonable expectation of employment. 43
Service members are entitled to be retained only for as long as they
comply with military regulations. 44 Thus, as long as the regulations
against homosexuals exist, discharged homosexuals will be unlikely
to succeed on fifth amendment property claims. As soon as homosexual military personnel acknowledge their homosexuality, they are no
longer in compliance with military regulations.
D. Due Process Concerns: Liberty Interests
Courts have described liberty interests as the "interest an individual has in being free to move about, live, and practice his profession without the burden of an unjustified label of infamy." 5 One
court found that the Navy had applied such a "label of infamy" to a
discharged homosexual.'4 6 This decision was reversed on appeal,
however." The plaintiffs in that case either admitted, or were found
in a predischarge hearing, to have engaged in homosexual acts.4 8
Thus, they could not claim that the Navy's charges were unjustified." 9 The court observed that the mere fact of discharge does not
deprive a person of a liberty interest. 50 The plaintiffs were also unable to establish that they had been labelled as "unfit".' 5' Instead, the
court noted that the stigma imposed was one of homosexuality rather
than unfitness. 52 Moreover, the plaintiffs' separation papers did not
141. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 1984); Belier v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 799 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980); Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 971-72 (E.D. Wis. 1980), afl'd, 826 F.2d 722
(7th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub nom., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied sub nom., Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
142. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
143. Rich, 735 F.2d at 1226; Belier, 632 F.2d at 799; Ben-Shalom, 489 F. Supp. at 97172.
144. Rich, 735 F.2d at 1226; Belier, 632 F.2d at 799; Ben-Shalom, 489 F. Supp. at 97172.
145. Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1976).
146. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 198 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom.,
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
147. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
148. Id. at 800.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 807.
151. Id. at 806.
152. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 1980).
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include any reasons for the discharge. 15 Thus, the plaintiffs' future
employers would never see any stigmatizing documents. 54
Even if a homosexual were given a dishonorable discharge, it
does not seem that he could establish an infringed liberty interest.
Service members separated for homosexuality either admit their homosexuality, or their homosexuality is established through an investigation .'5 Thus, any label of "homosexuality" would not be an unsupported charge and would not violate any protected liberty
interest.
In order to meet the "unjustified" requirement of a liberty interest claim, it seems that plaintiffs must convince the courts to equate
the label of "homosexuality" with one of "unfitness."' 6 This
presents an interesting dilemma for the courts. On the one hand, the
military asserts that homosexuals should be excluded from military
service because they are unfit. 57 Thus, it seems correct for the
courts to equate the two labels. One the other hand, there is ample
evidence indicating that homosexuality is unrelated to fitness to perform a job. 158 If a court accepts this evidence, it could not equate the
two labels. Such evidence, however, also weakens the military's rationale behind its policy of separating homosexuals on the basis of
unfitness.
E. The Right to Privacy
Before 1986, homosexuals stood on firmer ground when they
claimed that a right to privacy rendered the military regulations
against them unconstitutional. Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 59 however, privacy claims appear futile. In
Hardwick, the Court recognized that "rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection

. . .

include

. . .

those fundamental liberties

that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' "160 The
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id. See also Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 972
(E.D. Wis. 1980), affid, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
156. This is what the court did in Saal. See Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 198
(N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
157. See supra note 62. Unfitness for military duty becomes a presumption because the
military is not required to prove homosexual conduct. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 8.
159. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
160. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
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Court reviewed precedent and found that prior privacy cases revolved around matters of family, marriage, and/or procreation.16
The Court held that there was no constitutionally protected privacy
right to engage in consensual acts of homosexual sodomy because
homosexuality had "no connection" with any of these privacy
interests.16 '
F. Equal Protection
Although Hardwick forecloses privacy arguments, its reasoning
and implications are critical to the outcome of equal protection
claims of homosexuals separated from the military. The battle over
status and conduct homosexuals also resurfaces and plays a key role
in equal protection claims. If Hardwick is read to apply only to due
process claims, and a distinction is drawn between status and conduct homosexuals, then status homosexuals may convince a court to
declare the military's regulations on homosexuals unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds.16 If, on the other hand, Hardwick is read
to have broader implications, or, as in first amendment claims, courts
fail to draw a distinction between status and conduct, homosexual
plaintiffs' equal protection claims will fail.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment declares that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. 1 64 Fifth amendment equal protection claims against the federal government are treated the same as
fourteenth amendment claims."'
Equal protection claims are evaluated under one of three levels
of review. 66 As a general rule, government regulations are evaluated
under minimal scrutiny. 6 ' The court grants a high level of deference
to the regulation on the assumption that any "improvident" classifications will be corrected by the political process." A government
regulation will be upheld as long as it "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated stated purpose." '6 9 The regulation will stand
whether or not an individual member of a class burdened by it
161.
162.
163.

164.
165.
166.

Id. at 191.
Id.
See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 1989).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41

(1985).
167.
168.
169.

See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 463.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
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proves to be an exception to the stated purpose.17
Military regulations against homosexuals consistently have
passed the rational basis test.'7 1 Thus, the claims of homosexual
plaintiffs must be examined under a higher level of scrutiny if they
are to prevail under an equal protection theory. Government regulations will require heightened scrutiny only when the regulation creates suspect classifications. Classifications are suspect if they are
based on "factors which are so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy. 17
The Supreme Court has identified only the following three suspect classes: (1) race, (2) alienage, and (3) national ancestry and
ethnic origin . 73 Regulations discriminating against these classes will
be stricken unless they serve a compelling state interest and there is
no less restrictive means to accomplish the state interest.' 7 Gender
and illegitimacy are the only two quasi-suspect classes.' 5 Regulations against quasi-suspect classes must serve an important government interest and must be substantially related to the achievement
of that interest in order to be upheld.'7
Before a court reaches the question of whether or not homosexuals constitute a suspect class, a homosexual plaintiff must establish
that the regulation at issue is discriminatory. A finding of discrimination depends on both an interpretation of Hardwick and whether
or not there is a distinction between status and conduct
homosexuals.
Judge Norris of the Seventh Circuit asserted in his subsequently
withdrawn opinion in Watkins v. United States Army17 (I) and his
170. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1976).
171. See Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary of the
Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
172. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989).
173. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
174. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
175. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076. The Supreme Court has distinguished illegitimacy
because it bears no relation to an individual's ability to participate with and contribute to
society. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-07 (1976). Gender-based classifications warrant
a higher standard of review to "assure that the validity of a classification is determined
through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper role of men and women." Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982).
176. Id. at 1076 n.9.
177. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
178. 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Watkins 1").
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concurrence in. Watkins v. United States Army17 9 (II) that there was

a distinction between status and conduct homosexuals and that
Hardwick was not an obstacle to heightened scrutiny. 180 Judge Norris noted that the regulation in Watkins, which called for the dis-

charge of persons who "desired" to engage in homosexual acts, allowed for the discharge of homosexuals absent any proof of actual
homosexual conduct.' 8' This regulation targeted those of homosexual
orientation regardless of whether those persons had engaged in crim-

inal sodomy. The Army regulation allows a soldier who has engaged
in homosexual acts to escape discharge if he can show that it was a
"departure from the soldier's usual and customary behavior" which
is unlikely to recur because the isolated act resulted from immaturity, intoxication, coercion, or a desire to avoid service in the military.18 2 Thus, if a heterosexual and a homosexual. commit a homosexual act because they were drunk, only the homosexual would be
discharged, because only he had the requisite "desire."' 88 Judge
Norris used these stated exceptions to the Army's regulation on homosexuality to support a distinction between status and conduct. 18'
179.
180.
181.
182.

875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Watkins 1I").
Id. at 716-19 (Norris, J., concurring).
Id. at 714.
AR 635-200, ch. 15-3. Under AR 635-200, ch. 15-3, a soldier will be separated if:
(a) The soldier has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another
to engage in a homosexual act unless there are approved further findings that:
(1) Such conduct is a departure from the soldier's usual and customary behavior; and
(2) Such conduct is unlikely to recur because it is shown, for example, that the act occurred because of immaturity, intoxication, coercion,
or a desire to avoid military service; and
(3) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or
intimidation by the soldier during a period of military service; and
(4) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the soldier's continued presence in the Army is consistent with the interest of the Army in
proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(5) The soldier does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in
homosexual acts.
AR 635-200, ch. 15-3.
Note: To warrant retention of a soldier after finding that he or she engaged
in attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act, a
board's findings must specifically include all five findings listed in a(l) through
(5) above. In making these additional findings, a board should reasonably consider the evidence presented. For example, engagement in homosexual acts over
a long period of time could hardly be considered "a departure from the soldier's
usual and customary behavior." The intent of the policy is to permit retention
only of nonhomosexual soldiers who, because of extenuating circumstances (as
demonstrated by findings required by para 15-3a(l)-(5)) engaged in, attempted
to engage in, or solicited a homosexual act.
AR 635-200, ch. 15-3.
183. Watkins 11, 875 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 714-15.
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He found that the regulation embodied discrimination "about as
complete as one could imagine" against those of homosexual
orientation.' 8
This approach, however, was rejected by the Seventh Circuit,
which refused to recognize any distinction between homosexual status and conduct.' 86 The court observed, "The Army need not shut its
eyes to the practical realities of the situation."1 87 Instead, the Army
can make reasonable inferences about probable past and future conduct from a soldier's admission of homosexuality. 8 8 Such an admission, according to Judge Wood, constitutes reliable evidence of a desire and propensity to engage in homosexual conduct.18 9
In the dissent to Watkins I, Judge Reinhardt approached the
orientation/conduct distinction from a new perspective."' He felt
that the regulations targeted conduct alone, whether the conduct was
past, present, or future conduct. 9 1 Homosexuals, he asserted, differ
from groups such as blacks and women, who previously were
awarded heightened equal protection scrutiny because they are
groups identified by their conduct.' 92 Sodomy "is an act basic to homosexuality," an act that the Supreme Court has decided may be
criminalized.' 9 8 When conduct "fundamental to [group members']
very nature" and performed by a vast majority of a group's members
is subject to criminalization, "[ilt cannot be asserted with any legitimacy that the group is specially protected by the Constitution.' 94
Judge Reinhardt saw the exceptions to the regulations as a means
for the Army to identify those likely to engage in homosexual conduct in the future.' 95
Judges Norris, Wood, and Reinhardt present solid arguments.
Judge Norris's opinion is particularly well-reasoned; however, Judge
Reinhardt's position is the most convincing. Right or wrong, both
status and conduct homosexuals are defined as a class by their con185. Id. at 716.
186. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989). See also supra notes
125-27 and accompanying text..
187. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 454.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1353 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
191. Id. at 1362.
192. Id. at 1356-57.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1357, 1361 n.19.
195. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1353 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
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duct in society. 196 Two members of the same sex can develop strong
platonic emotional attachment to one another, yet not be deemed
homosexual. When the two commit, or desire to commit physical
sexual acts, however, society then considers them and their relationship to be homosexual. Thus, any distinction between status and conduct homosexuals is based on unstable foundations. 9 If no distinction between status and conduct is drawn, any equal protection claim
seems bound to fail because homosexual conduct can be criminalized, and any military regulation targeting such conduct would be
198
upheld.
Even if a distinction between status and conduct is drawn, a
homosexual plaintiff would then face the burdens presented by
Hardwick and its implications. 9 9 Judge Norris read Hardwick as
being limited to the due process question of privacy rights.200 Hardwick, he observed, did not challenge the sodomy statute in question
on equal protection grounds, nor did the Court reach any direct conclusion on an equal protection claim.210 Thus, Judge Norris felt free
to decide whether or not the government could penalize homosexuals
based on their orientation rather than their conduct without violating
the equal protection clause.20 2
The Seventh Circuit, in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 0 3 interpreted
Hardwick very differently. Not only did Judge Wood read Hardwick
to impact on any equal protection claim brought by homosexuals
separated from the military, but he considered it dispositive on the
issue.20° If homosexual conduct could be criminalized under the Constitution, he reasoned, then homosexuals could never be a quasi-suspect or suspect class20 5 in equal protection analysis. 0 6 Judge Wood
also pointed out that even the dissenters in Hardwick did not necessarily want to preclude all regulations against homosexuals. 0 7 Judge
Wood emphasized the military context of the plaintiff's claim and
the more limited constitutional protection accorded to military per196. Id. at 1356-57.
197. See id.
198. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
199. See id.
200. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
201. Id. at 716.
202. Id.
203. 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Ben-Shalom III"), cert. denied sub nor.,
Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
206. Ben-Shalom I11, 881 F.2d at 464.
207. Id. at 465.
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sonnel as compared to those rights accorded civilians. 0 8
Judge Reinhardt, in his dissent to Watkins I, interpreted Hardwick differently than did Judge Norris. Judge Reinhardt saw two
possible ways to read Hardwick.2 0 9 Either the case was about "sodomy," which meant heterosexual sodomy was as unprotected as ho-

mosexual sodomy, or the case was concerned with "homosexuality,"
which meant some acts are protected if done by heterosexuals but

unprotected if done by homosexuals.2 10 The Court in Hardwick held
that there was no constitutionally protected right to commit homosexual consensual sodomy.2" Thus, Judge Reinhardt argued, if
Hardwick was about "homosexuality," and the right to sexual privacy should not be applied evenhandedly, then equal protection did
not require the equal treatment of homosexual and heterosexual conduct. 1 Judge Reinhardt then found that Hardwick was about homosexuality rather than about "sodomy. ' 213 The statute in the case
was neutral on its face.21 ' Thus, if the Court had viewed the case as
one about "sodomy," it could have upheld the law without discussing
homosexuality. However, as Judge Reinhardt noted, the Court made
it very clear that it was dealing only with homosexual sodomy, and
had a very distinct "anti-homosexual thrust. 21 5
Although Hardwick did not address the equal protection question, Judge Reinhardt's analysis is most compelling. It is difficult to
deny the antihomosexual slant of the opinion. The Court evaluated
the case based on the potential fundamental right of homosexual
sodomy, not of sodomy alone.21 6 The Court also discussed the "morality of homosexuality" instead of the morality of sodomy.2 17 A very
different evaluation would have resulted had the case involved a heterosexual couple.21 8 Thus, it is reasonable to interpret Hardwick as
not only applying to equal protection claims, but acting as a virtual
barrier to any such claims.
If Judge Norris's opinions are accepted, a homosexual plaintiff's
208. Id. The Tenth Circuit also read Hardwick as dispositive when applied to equal
protection claims. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (10th Cir. 1989).
209. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
210. Id.
211. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
212. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1355 n.5 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1355.
214. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.I.
215. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1355 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
216. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
217. Id. at 196.
218. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1355 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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case against the military would have to establish that homosexuals
are a suspect or quasi-suspect class in order to gain increased scrutiny. To be suspect or quasi-suspect, the class must qualify under
four factors:2 19 (1) the class must suffer from a history of discrimination;220 (2) the class must suffer from grossly unfair discrimination
that rises to the level of "invidious" discrimination; 2 1 (3) the class
must be defined by an immutable trait;222 and (4) the class must
228
constitute a politically powerless minority.
Homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful discrimination; they clearly meet the first requirement.2 2 ' The Army conceded

to this history in Watkins v. United States Army

(II).225

The second factor, gross unfairness, focuses upon incorrect stereotypes, and how those stereotypes unfairly disadvantage the class
members. 226 Discrimination must also be so inconsistent with the
ideals of equal protection as to be termed "invidious. 2 27 There are
numerous examples of homosexual service members who have
demonstrated an aptitude for military service. 228 Therefore, any attempt to portray a causal link between homosexual orientation and
poor job performance would be grossly unfair. 2 9
There is judicial disagreement, however, on the question of invidiousness. In Padula v. Webster,25 0 the D.C. Circuit rejected the
equal protection claim brought by a homosexual Federal Bureau of
Investigation agent.2 81 The court reasoned that because the Supreme
Court allows states to criminalize behavior that defines the class of
homosexuals, the circuit court could not "conclude that state sponsored discriminations against the class [was] invidious. 2 82
Judge Norris rejected Padula as a conduct-oriented homosexu219. Miller, supra note 20, at 812.
220. Id. at 814-15.
221. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724-25 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring); Miller, supra note 20, at 814.
222. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 725-26 (Norris, J., concurring); Miller, supra note 20, at
812-13.
223. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 (Norris, J., concurring); Miller, supra note 20, at 81516.
224. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 (Norris, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 724.
226. Miller, supra note 20, at 814, 814 rr.105.
227. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring). The invidious requirement keeps undeserving groups, such as burglars, from
meeting the grossly unfair factor. Id.
228. See supra note 8.
229. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724 (Norris, J., concurring).
230. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
231. Id. at 104.
232. Id. at 103.
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ality case. 233 He also felt that the court in Padula erred by reading
Hardwick to preclude a finding that homosexuals were a suspect
class.2 3 4 Thus, Judge Norris was able to find invidious discrimination
against homosexuals based upon the incorrect stereotypes. 3 Judge
Wood, in contrast, followed Padula in Ben-Shalom III.231 In light of
the military context of the case, Judge Wood could not see how the
discrimination against homosexual service members could reach the
required level of invidiousness2
A determination of invidious discrimination against homosexuals appears to rest on the prior finding of a distinction between status
and conduct homosexuals. If no distinction is drawn, discrimination
against homosexuals could be justified as a warranted bias against a
class of persons who engage in criminalized sexual acts. If, however,
homosexual orientation is separate from homosexual conduct, such
bias would appear invidious because the discrimination is based upon
the generally inaccurate stereotype of homosexual unfitness.2 38
Immutability, the third factor considered for suspect class status, should lead to a finding of invidiousness with respect to homosexuality. The less control a person has over the trait defining his
class, the more likely a court would find invidious discrimination. 3 89
Finding immutability requires legal as well as scientific analysis.
"Immutability" in a legal context does not mean the strictest interpretation of that word. For instance, "sex" and "alienage" are considered immutable traits even though a person could change these
traits respectively through medical or naturalization processes.24 0 Instead, the test for immutability turns on whether the trait is "so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government
to penalize a person for refusing to change .... ,,2,1
Although scientific inquiry in this area is incomplete, most research indicates sex233. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 725.
236. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.,
Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
237. Id. at 466.
238. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 725 (Norris, J.,concurring).
239. See id. at 724-25. The Supreme Court has held that because no child is responsible
for his birth, "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing." Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
240. Judge Norris suggested that some persons can pass themselves off as being members of a different race. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Norris, J., concurring).
241. Id. See also Miller, supra note 20, at 813.
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ual orientation is determined by the age of five or six. 42 In addition,
science suggests that sexual orientation generally is impervious to
change.2 48 Thus, homosexuality may not be as irreversible as race,
but it appears to pass the legal test of immutability.
Once immutability is determined the homosexual plaintiff must
establish that the homosexual class is a politically powerless minor24 4
ity, unable to command protection from majoritarian politics.
Homosexuals in general appear to lack the political power to over24 5
turn the discriminatory treatment to which they are subjected.
Not only do they lack political clout, but homosexuals are under
great societal pressures to conceal their sexual orientations as well. 246
As a result, the potential political impact of homosexuals is further
weakened.24 7 In light of the history of discrimination against homosexuals and of the societal attitude towards them, it seems unlikely
that many legislators would support any political cause in favor of
homosexuals. 48

Although homosexuals lack political clout,2 49 they still may fail
to qualify as a politically powerless minority.28 0 The court in BenShalom III felt that a political option was available to homosexuals

that would enable them to change the Army's regulation against
them. 251 Furthermore, the Supreme Court refused to recognize mentally retarded people as politically powerless. 82 If the mentally retarded are not considered politically powerless, it seems homosexuals
would not be deemed politically powerless either. Therefore it is not
clear that homosexuals necessarily constitute a politically powerless
minority.
Although homosexuals could present a strong argument for

qualification as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, such an argument
242. See Miller, supra note 20, at 813.
243. See id. But see Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(federal circuit did not consider homosexual behavior an immutable characteristic).
244. Miller, supra note 20, at 815, 815 n.121.
245. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring); Miller, supra note 20, at 826.
246. See Toufexis, supra note 23, at 56.
247. The Army claimed in Watkins 11 that homosexuals cannot be politically powerless
because two states have laws prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals. See Watkins,
875 F.2d at 727 n.30.
248. See Toufexis, supra note 23, at 56.
249. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 (Norris, J., concurring).
250. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub
nom., Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
251. Id.
252. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) ("[It cannot
be said that the mentally retarded] have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers."). See also Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466.
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seems doomed to fail. Homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination and homosexuality appears immutable in light of current
research.25 a Homosexuals also seem to be a politically powerless minority,2 54 although this is not a definite conclusion. The obstacle to
attaining heightened scrutiny of their claims is gross unfairness. 55
Although homosexuals are victims of inaccurate stereotypes, any
bias is not clearly invidious."" As long as homosexual status can be
equated with homosexual conduct, and as long as that conduct can
be criminalized, homosexuals will not merit suspect or quasi-suspect
classification.
Even if homosexuals are determined to be a suspect class, it is
not clear that the military's regulations on homosexuality would be
declared unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit applied an intermediate
level of scrutiny to a discharged homosexual officer's equal protection claim and still found in favor of the Army."5 ' The court felt that
the deference it owed to the compelling military interest in maintaining a strong force combined with the impracticality of structuring a
more closely tailored regulation outweighed any right to equal protection.2 a" The Tenth Circuit also noted that the Army's compelling
interests would prevail if heightened scrutiny was applied to an equal
protection claim.2 59 The Seventh Circuit considered Sergeant BenShalom's equal protection claim as deserving of nothing more than
the lowest level of scrutiny. 2 0
The great deference given by the judiciary to the military
253. See Miller, supra note 20, at 813.
254. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
255. Id. at 724.
256. See Miller, supra note 20, at 821-24. Miller also describes the various stereotypical
beliefs about homosexuals harbored by American society today. For other commentary suggesting that claims by homosexuals should receive heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause, see, e.g., Chaitlin & Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect?, 8 LINCOLN L. REV. 24 (1973);
Dressier, Judicial Homophobia: Gay Rights Biggest Roadblock, CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW,
Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 19, 22; Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 527, 556-61 (1979);
O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 19, 71-75 (1979); Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REV. 687,
692-98 (1975); Comment, Challenging Sexual Preference Discrimination in Private Employment, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 513-14 (1980).
257. Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981).
258. Id.
259. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 1984).
260. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463-66 (7th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit's
Judge Norris would undoubtedly distinguish the first two cases as conduct cases, which are
inapplicable to status cases. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 721-22 (9th
Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
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weighs in favor of the military's position. 261 On the other hand, strict

examination of the military's rationale behind its policy against
homosexuals weakens its case.26 The military's blanket regulations
are bound to result in the discharge of exemplary service members,
and, therefore, do not seem well tailored to the military's interests. 263
VI.

The Military's Option: A Nexus Requirement

The military may be able to change its current regulations and
yet retain the ability to exclude and separate those homosexual service members who are detrimental to the armed forces' efficiency.
The military could incorporate a nexus requirement into its regulations that would require proof of a causal relationship between homosexuality and unfitness for military service before a homosexual is
discharged.2 64 With a nexus requirement, a service member still
could be discharged for homosexuality, but only if the person's homosexuality interfered with the efficiency of the military. "6 Such a
requirement would enable service members whose sexual orientation
neither detracts from their performance nor detracts from the military's mission to continue to serve their country. The military would
retain the power to discharge homosexuals who hinder the military
mission, but it would also benefit from the retention of exemplary
personnel who would be discharged under present regulations.2 66
The requirement of showing a nexus between the individual's
homosexuality and unfitness is not entirely without precedent in the
courts. 6 ' The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
imposed a nexus requirement on the Civil Service Commission in
Norton v. Macy. " ' In Norton, the court did not find that homosexual conduct was an invalid cause for dismissal. " 9 Instead, the court
required that the commission show a link between homosexuality
and a decrease in the service's efficiency before homosexuality could
261. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 458-62, 466.
262. Nightline reported a recent Pentagon sponsored study of homosexuals that suggested the military fitness of homosexuals was as good or better than the fitness of the average
heterosexual in terms of intellect, behavior, and social adjustment. Nightline, supra note 2.
263. See supra note 8.
264. See Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Saal v. Middendorf,
427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom., Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
265. Martinez, 449 F. Supp. at 212; Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 203.
266. See supra note 8.
267. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
268. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
269. Id. at 1164, 1168.
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constitute grounds for dismissal. 7
Although no longer the law in the Ninth Circuit, two decisions
from the United States District Court of the Northern District of
California followed Norton and imposed a nexus requirement on the
Navy.27 1 In Saal v. Middendorf,27 2 the plaintiff service member had
demonstrated fitness for service and had done nothing to warrant
discharge other than acknowledge her homosexuality. 27 8' The court
believed the Navy's blanket policy against homosexuals was arbitrary and irrational under the facts of the case. 274 Among all possible reasons for discharge from the Navy, the court noted that only
homosexuality and the trafficking of drugs-or the fraudulent
preservice concealment of either-warranted mandatory separation. 5 All other grounds for separation required a decision based
upon the merits of each case.2 76 Thus, the court felt justified when it
imposed a nexus requirement on the Navy.27
Both the court in Saal and the court in Martinez v. Brown,27 8
held that the Navy could still separate those service members whose
homosexuality rendered them unfit for service.27 9 The court in Martinez noted, "[W]e do not hold that the Navy is constitutionally
barred from discharging . . . persons on account of homosexuality, if
upon factual consideration it is determined that that characteristic
has a direct bearing on that individual's fitness for service." 280 Thus,
fitness was to be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of all
factors, homosexuality included.28 1
By incorporating a nexus requirement in its regulations, the military's interest in maintaining a strong force would not be compromised. The military would retain the power to enforce its stated policies against homosexuals.2 82 Homosexual service members who cause
270. Id. at 1167-69.
271. Martinex v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Saal v. Middendorf, 427
F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nor., Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980) (the court applied only a rational basis test).
272. 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom., Belier v. Middendorf, 632
F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
273. Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 194.
274. Id. at 202.
275. Id. at 200.
276. See id. at 200, 202.
277. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 201-03 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom.,
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
278. 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
279. Id. at 212. See also Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 201-03.
280. Martinez, 449 F. Supp. at 212.
281. Id. See also Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 202-03.
282. See Folk, supra note 30, at 78.
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disruptions of discipline or efficiency by their conduct or by their
notoriety as homosexuals could be discharged.2 83 The military could
also separate those homosexuals whose homosexual relations with
other service members caused a breakdown in chain of command efficiency or military preparedness. 284 The military simply would be
required to demonstrate a rational connection between the person's
homosexuality and a decrease in military efficiency.2 85 The military
would then benefit by retaining some exemplary service members
who otherwise would be lost to the armed forces. 8
A nexus requirement would not affect all homosexuals already
in, or attempting to enter, the military. Those homosexuals who
cause disruptions by their effect upon others, rather than by their
performance, would still be subject to discharge. The military also
would retain the power to exclude those homosexuals who seem
likely to cause a disruption, based upon their past history, medical
exams, or psychological screenings. In general, only those homosexuals fit to perform and unlikely to cause disruptions would be retained. Although the proposed system would probably not lead to
full homosexual integration into the military, it would provide new
opportunities for homosexuals in an area from which they have been
previously excluded.
VII.

Conclusion

Homosexual service members cannot expect the judiciary to impose a nexus requirement on the military in the immediate future.
The courts' traditional deference to the military regarding the internal affairs of the armed forces is deeply entrenched and carries great
weight in the judicial system. Attempts to distinguish homosexual
orientation from homosexual conduct currently appear doomed to
fail in the courts. Regardless of the reasons or the merits, in our
society homosexuals are defined by their conduct. Thus, as long as
Bowers v. Hardwick remains good law, homosexuals alleging constitutional violations will run into great opposition in the courts.
283. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court noted the
following factors that may be relevant to efficiency hearings: (I) whether the employee makes
offensive overtures while on the job; (2) whether the employee's conduct is notorious; and (3)
the reactions of fellow employees and of the public with whom the homosexual comes in contact in the course of his official duties. Id.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 1164. See also Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207, 212 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 201-03 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Belier
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980).
286. See supra note 8.
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Congress also appears unlikely to provide any relief to homosexual service members separated from the military. At its worst, our
society condemns homosexuality. At its best, our society is coldly tolerant of homosexuality. A great majority of our Congressmen seem
to share the negative societal attitude toward homosexuals and are
adverse to any legislation that protects homosexuality.
Thus, the military itself provides the last potential source of relief for homosexual service members. Although the military is highly
unlikely to abandon its policy against homosexuals, it might and it
should consider a nexus requirement. Clearly, some homosexuals
perform well in the armed forces; on the other hand, some homosexuals pose a threat to important military interests. A nexus requirement seems a logical method for the military to distinguish the two
groups, and to retain homosexual members who are an asset to the
military.
Society views homosexuality as an anomaly, and treats homosexuals inconsistently, at best. Homosexual conduct is criminalized
in almost half of the states, yet those laws are rarely enforced. Sexual orientation seems immutable, yet there is a belief that it is not as
immutable as race or gender. Society has been unable to, or more
probably, unwilling to decide exactly how it should view homosexuality. Traditional moralistic concepts condemning homosexuality do
not appear subject to quick reversal. In time, however, as homosexuals continue to demonstrate that they can contribute to society, they
will most likely be accepted in all areas of employment. A nexus
requirement in the military might not be a great victory for homosexuals, but it would be at least one step toward influencing societal
attitudes and integrating homosexuals into society.
Craig W. Stedman

